Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 4

2022

Lessons Learned: Mike Leahy
Yasemin Sim Esmen

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Finance and
Financial Management Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and
Evaluation Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Sim Esmen, Yasemin (2022) "Lessons Learned: Mike Leahy," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4 : Iss. 4,
622-625.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss4/32

This Lessons Learned is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Mike Leahy
By Yasemin Sim Esmen
Mike Leahy was associate director at the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of International
Finance between 2008 and 2010. He was instrumental in establishing swap lines with foreign
central banks and reviewed and reported on excess reserve balances and required interest
payments to depository institutions. This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with
Leahy on October 22, 2020; the full transcript may be accessed here.
Paying interest on banks’ reserves is a good way to control interest rates during a
crisis where liquidity is a cause for concern.
Leahy explained that because banks were, at the time of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
required to hold reserves at the Federal Reserve against certain types of accounts, and
historically the Fed did not pay interest on reserves, they would engage in behaviors to
minimize the amount of reserves they would have to maintain. One tactic was to
automatically sweep the funds out of accounts that required reserves right before reserve
requirements were to be assessed and then move the funds back into these accounts once
the assessment was completed. This was an inefficient use of resources, generating
numerous extra transactions for the sole purpose of avoiding having to deposit reserves.
This circumstance prompted Congress to pass a law in 2006 authorizing the Federal Reserve
to pay interest on banks’ reserves. The law was to take effect in 2011 to allow time for
institutions to adjust. However, the Fed was injecting substantial amounts of liquidity into
the banking system to effect its emergency lending and crisis-time monetary policy. As a
result, the necessity to implement the payment of interest on reserves became urgent, so the
Fed could implement its monetary policy rate independently of its financial markets
interventions. Paying interest provided the Federal Reserve with an instrument to control
interest rates. Leahy explained,
The Fed was injecting lots of liquidity into the market to meet the liquidity concerns
of financial institutions. That was driving the interest rates in the market, in particular
the fed funds rate, below what the Fed was targeting. Paying interest on reserves
seemed to provide a way to separate the provision of liquidity, which was needed to
support financial institutions, and control over the fed funds rate, which was needed
to manage overall economic activity and inflation. The power to pay interest on
reserves was seen as offering a second tool that the Fed could use to influence market
rates. It is always better to have more tools to achieve your goals.
Foreign central banks had used this instrument before, but the Federal Reserve had not, as
it never had authority to pay interest on banks’ reserves.
Once that authority could be utilized, a related issue appeared, recalled Leahy. Because the
legislation only authorized payment of interest to banks, the Fed still could not pay interest
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on the large deposits that it held for the giant government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. “So, that technicality in the law complicated things,” said Leahy.
Because such financial institutions could not receive interest on their reserves with the Fed,
they were willing to lend at a rate lower than the Fed floor rate to earn a return on their
funds. This, in turn, could cause the fed funds rate to drop below the Fed’s interest rate on
reserves, causing a “leaky floor.”
The Fed was resourceful and creative in finding a solution to this challenge, Leahy stated. A
“reverse repurchase facility” allowed the GSEs to deposit their extra liquidity at the Fed
temporarily in exchange for Treasury securities. The repurchase agreements priced the
Treasuries so that the GSEs bought them at one price and sold them back the next day at a
slightly higher price. “In that way,” said Leahy, “the GSEs could essentially get the same floor
rate as banks could get if they had funds they could leave on deposit at the Fed.” During the
time that the target was close to the rate of interest paid on reserves, continued Leahy, “the
strategy actually helped quite a bit in keeping rates pretty close to the target the FOMC had
set for the fed funds rate.”
In a crisis, careful attention needs to be paid to disruptions in dollar funding markets
abroad, as they may spill back into the United States.
Because the US dollar is used around the world, when dollar funding seized up during the
GFC, it became a global phenomenon as the shortage of dollar funding in one market spread
to others. Further, because international markets were open and linked, disruptions in dollar
markets in Europe or Asia could easily spill back to the US and disrupt the economy. To avoid
this, the Federal Reserve turned to central bank currency swap lines, which it had used in
the past. Said Leahy, “They were used as a tool for intervening in foreign exchange markets
for many years, during the Bretton Woods period when exchange rates were pegged, but we
have been away from that for quite a while.”
The Fed would do a swap transaction with, say, the European Central Bank (ECB) where it
received euros as collateral for providing an agreed-upon amount of US dollars. The ECB
would then decide who to lend to in their jurisdictions.
It was up to the ECB to assess the conditions in its jurisdictions. Were their financial
institutions just facing a nonfunctioning market, or were they in trouble? Did they
have credit risk? The ECB would have to make a decision on whether it should lend
to those institutions or not, but that is something that they can do because they
followed those institutions in those markets and the Federal Reserve did not.
After some set time, the transaction would be unwound. At the end of the transaction, the
ECB would return the dollars to the Fed, which would return the euros held as collateral to
the ECB,. There was a lot of interest on the part of foreign central banks to receive these swap
lines, explained Leahy; they were also well received: “There was a lot of familiarity with the
central banks that were party to the agreements in the past. It wasn’t hard to set up the lines;
it was not setting up something from scratch.”
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The swap lines helped foreign central banks better deal with the conditions in their markets
and helped foreign markets gain confidence that there was dollar liquidity available to them,
which, in turn, helped keep funding costs down.
The basic idea was to try to meet dollar funding needs outside the United States and
to help the foreign central banks play the role that only they could play in figuring out
how to help keep funding functioning in their local markets. In my assessment, it
worked amazingly well, it really was quite successful. The Federal Reserve provided
liquidity, the foreign central banks always returned that dollar liquidity, there were
never any losses that the Fed had to bear.
To avoid a financial crisis, we need to pay attention to systemic risk, not just to
individual banks.
“Part of the problem,” said Leahy, “was that [prior to the GFC], the global financial community
did not really look at this risk in a systemic way.” Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis,
many bank supervisors looked at individual banks and did not pay attention to systemic risk.
Often banks looked like they had little risk because their risk was hedged. Leahy pointed out
the weaknesses in this traditional approach:
However, all hedging does is shift risk—it doesn’t make risk go away. In this case, one
of the initial problems was that there were some bad loans made for real estate
housing that could not be paid back, and then once the losses started, they propagated
quickly throughout the financial system. The subprime mortgage market was riskier
than many had appreciated.
Part of the risk was systemic. Financial institutions all thought they were hedging
somehow. You could package these risky loans and sell them off, thinking somebody
else would hold the risk. However, the risk did not go away, it was just getting
redistributed, in ways that were not transparent.
This lack of transparency meant that as soon as concerns about those mortgage loans
surfaced, markets seized up because one could not make sure which institutions had bad
loans in their portfolios and how to assess a counterparty’s risk. This caused wide panic and
led to banks being reluctant to lend.
During the financial crisis, there was essentially a seizing up of markets. People did
not want to lend to one another because they were concerned that they would never
get their money back if they lent it out. “Many firms were failing, which led people in
the market to be suspicious about the health of the financial counterparties that they
were dealing with. Instead of lending, financial institutions hoarded funds, and their
unwillingness to lend imposed a huge constraint on the ability to do business. That
was a key part of the problem with the global financial crisis: The panic in the financial
market made it difficult for households and businesses to get the funds they needed
to conduct normal economic activities.”
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Leahy points out that since the GFC, there has been widespread recognition of systemic risks
and systemic elements have been incorporated into supervisory surveillance: “For example,
the Federal Reserve set up a financial stability function and began conducting regular stress
tests for financial institutions, among other things.”
We need to pay attention to risks involved with new financial instruments.
Financial markets are creative and come up with new instruments. “I think that the lesson
from the Global Financial Crisis,” stated Leahy, “is that sometimes innovation is a good thing,
but we need to pay attention to the risk.” We need to be mindful of the risks associated with
new instruments and try to assess what risks they bring and whether they might pose bigger,
systemic risks. It is not always easy to foresee risks associated with them. “That could be the
key challenge: understanding the risks associated with new things,” said Leahy. And “the
thing with the US is that, if we’re talking about a risk to dollar credit markets, that becomes
almost instantly an international problem because the dollar still has a pretty important role
in global funding.”
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